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While a consensus is emerging about the importance o f  state building and state capac­
ity for democratization in both post-communist and developing countries, compara­
tively few explicit attempts have been made to provide empirical support for the 
relationship between the two concepts. Even more problematic is to find an explicit 
causal mechanism linking high state capacity with democracy. State capacity can be 
understood as the capability o f  the state to penetrate society, regulate social relations, 
extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways. In other words, 
strong states have high capabilities to complete these tasks, while weak states struggle 
to compete with private actors over extraction and appropriation o f  resources. But what 
makes strong states more likely to be democratic and, in turn, weak states less likely to 
be democratic? This article explores whether or not state capacity correlates with the 
outcomes o f  founding elections, that is, the first open elections in post-communist 
countries. In other words, do voters in states with higher initial capacity also tend to 
“throw the communist rascals out” in the founding elections?
Keywords: state capacity’; founding elections; democracy; post-communist
The links between a strong state and democratic institutions have been empha­sized by many scholars.1 Linz and Stepan, for example, argue that an effective 
state is essential to support the other building blocks of democratic consolidation 
(civil, political, economic, and the rule of law).2 For democracy to flourish, the state 
must possess the means necessary to maintain the rule of law, to protect the rights of 
citizens, and to regulate economic transactions. But what is the mechanism by which 
this dynamic operates? Using the case of former communist countries, the hypoth­
esis developed in this article links levels of state capacity with the results of found­
ing elections: rejection of the past was less likely in states which were least efficient 
in providing public goods.
The literature generally assigns considerable importance to founding elections. 
Not only are first democratic elections used as time markers of change, the outcomes
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of such elections have also been theorized as setting the tone for the transition path 
followed in post-communist countries. Among others, Steven Fish demonstrated that 
the results of the first democratic elections empowered governments which then set 
the course for economic policy change. Valerie Bunce also emphasized the signifi­
cance of a clear victory for the “opposition” over the old regime forces. Only in such 
scenarios—where opposition forces obtain a clear victory—would democratization 
and transition to capitalism come together, as a package.3 By contrast, where com­
munists emerged victorious, economic transition would be rejected. In the many 
cases in between the two extremes, where neither side wins a clear victory, regimes 
would not necessarily pursue a dual approach of adopting both democratization and 
economic liberalization.
Given the importance of founding elections for democratic and economic devel­
opments, this article examines the empirical evidence for some of their determi­
nants. The hypothesis I defend is that there exists a strong relationship between the 
administrative capacity of the state upon reaching independence and the rejection of 
the communist past, operationalized through popular support for communist succes­
sor parties in the first free post-communist elections. The rationale behind this choice 
is simple: successor communist parties were the most visible manifestations of con­
tinuity with the authoritarian past. The present article uses statistical modeling to 
evaluate how well this hypothesis reflects the reality of post-communist transforma­
tions and proceeds in two steps. In a first step, I look at twenty-six post-communist 
countries to demonstrate that initial state capacity scores are crucial explanatory 
factors of why certain countries held founding elections and some others did not. In 
the second step, I examine the sixteen countries in which founding elections took 
place to demonstrate that initial state capacity scores are also linked to the success 
of communist successor parties in these contests. I propose two explanations for this 
finding. Firstly, the emergence of an autonomous civil society and of political parties 
was constrained in environments in which the state administration was inefficient 
and corruption rife. In environments of state capture such as these, which are devoid 
of a vocal opposition, entrenched former communist elites were more likely to thrive 
since they were able to use their position to gain electoral advantages, for instance 
by using the resources of the state to buy support.
Rejecting the Communist Past, or Not
Considering citizens’ newfound capacity to hold officials accountable in free and 
fair elections, it might have seemed reasonable to expect support for the party 
responsible for the maintenance of an authoritarian and unpopular regime to be low 
across the board in the first post-communist elections. Some commentators even 
believed that communist parties would simply disappear as the arena for competition
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opened up. Yet in reality, most communist parties not only survived, but also gar­
nered sizeable electoral success in the first free and fair elections held after the col­
lapse of state communism. Support for communist successor parties varied from 
0.66 percent in Latvia (where the official party had been banned) to 56.2 percent in 
Albania. Despite previous experience with democracy and the existence of political 
parties in Eastern Central Europe (ECE) prior to the establishment of communism, 
most political parties predating the communist period failed to achieve significant 
success with the restoration of free electoral competition. For example, the 
Hungarian founding elections held in March 1990 were dominated by new political 
parties formed in the late 1980s, not by the pre-communist entities. This has led 
observers to question the continuity of party systems.4 Hence, preexisting political 
parties cannot provide a sufficient explanation for the different success rates of com­
munist successor parties in most cases. What then accounts for such large differ­
ences in patterns of rejection of the communist past?
The interpretation of electoral success I propose in this article is mainly external­
ist. Given the very short time span between the collapse of authoritarian regimes and 
the holding of founding elections in most post-communist countries, early success is 
not only linked to the quality of party organization, but more immediately to the 
capacity of the state to perform its crucial role as a provider of public goods at the 
outset of the transition. Modern states must be able to provide essential public goods 
for the smooth functioning of society. At the very least, basic public goods involve 
guaranteeing territorial integrity, safeguarding physical and material security, mobi­
lizing public savings, coordinating resource allocation, and providing the conditions 
for effective citizenship.5 Many former Soviet Union (FSU) countries gained inde­
pendence without the infrastructural capacities to perform these tasks as successfully 
as other more established states. In comparison, ECE countries already had much 
more experience of statehood. In this article, I argue that these differences matter in 
patterns of founding elections because inefficient public good provision constrains 
competition and creates an environment in which captor parties are in a better posi­
tion to exploit state resources to stay in power.
In the cases at hand, the fall of ruling communist parties, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, signaled an opening in the political arena to new play­
ers. A plethora of political parties, often representing particular interests, responded 
to this opportunity. Between fifty and two hundred political parties initially appeared 
in most countries whose political scene was at least partly free. However, with this 
proliferation of options and a lack of examples from the near past to rely on, the 
transitional period between the fall of communist regimes and the first democratic 
elections presented a special case of party competition. In this situation voters had 
only very inchoate ideas about each party’s viability or their ideological place­
ment. The transitional partisan environment was characterized by weak or nonex­
istent partisan attachment, but also by very fragmented competition along several 
salient dimensions, with a public highly distrustful of political parties.6 In fact, the
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opposing forces taking part in the first democratic elections each generally concen­
trated around one of two clusters. These consisted of the former communist parties, 
on the one hand, and umbrella groups around which many smaller anticommunist 
groups coalesced, on the other. These latter were not political parties in the classical 
sense of the term.7 In this setting, communist successor parties were the most recog­
nizable political formations in a sea of new parties. Former party elites also enjoyed 
high public recognition as well as important levels of political experience and 
organizational skills.
Di Palma argues that democratic transitions are more likely to be orderly and 
peaceful when the democratic opposition respects state institutions and considers 
them able to service democracy.8 However, what happens when the state is failing, 
or inefficient in its allocation and delivery of public goods? The twin challenge of 
establishing democracy and organizing the state on a new basis of legitimacy was 
unquestionably a mammoth task for interim governments. The issue of state legiti­
macy posed an additional challenge during the transition process for the new states 
emerging from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The employment of old-regime 
legality to build democratic institutions was not evident in all cases. The independ­
ent countries that surfaced after the collapse of the Soviet Union were not com­
pletely new entities, and most of them sported the institutions, bureaucracy and staff 
left behind by the previous regime.
The capacity of each state at the time of transition is therefore a direct legacy of 
the previous regime and thus a particularly important factor in understanding regime 
outcomes. Once the USSR fell apart, the concentration of formal governing institu­
tions in Moscow, in the shape of All-Union ministries and Union-republican minis­
tries, meant that republics that had never been independent before needed to fill a 
large institutional vacuum in a short period of time. ECE countries only needed to 
reform their existing state institutions, and Baltic states were at least able to draw on 
their pre-war democratic experience. Adding to these challenges, the disappearance 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the main institution of over­
sight at all levels of government, also left an institutional void that needed to be 
filled. However, even the capacities of the successor states—founding members of 
the USSR—that emerged from seven decades of Soviet rule varied enormously. This 
diversity of capacity was likewise reflected in the challenges new (or incumbent) 
rulers faced in imposing state authority on the new sovereign territories. Consequently 
former communist states did not commence their transition to democracy or new 
found independence from the same starting point: ECE and Baltic States were con­
siderably advantaged in infrastructural capacity in relation to their Soviet counter­
parts.9 In those cases where the state’s legal structures were weak or nonexistent 
during the transition, incumbents were in a better position to utilize state assets to 
further their own political positions and hinder the rise of competition.
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We already know that communist parties which stayed close to power, or man­
aged the transition, had both formal and informal advantages over their opponents. 
They were able to influence the rules of the new game in interim governments and 
to use their access to state resources to either gather support or undermine the com­
petition.10 The necessary condition for the exit of communist parties was the rise of 
competing political parties capable of providing a credible alternative. This could 
only happen where formal political institutions—which influence political opportu­
nity structures—were open to a certain degree.11 Is it the case that, in former com­
munist countries, a climate associated with a weaker state where collective goods are 
not adequately provided and the administration is subject to high levels of corruption 
makes it more difficult for the opposition to mobilize to overthrow a country’s for­
mer rulers? My contention here is that robust opposition was more likely to arise in 
an environment of efficient public good provision in which elites faced more con­
straints in extracting state assets to finance their hold on power. By contrast, environ­
ments of inefficient public good provision breed corruption and state capture, which 
in turn generally constrain competition. As in a market environment where captor 
firms use their connections with public officials to enact barriers to thwart the rise of 
competitors and burden them with regulations, captor political parties have had a 
vested interest in keeping the state weak. This enables these parties to continue 
extracting rents and to restrain competing parties from accessing these advantages. 
Therefore, it is not only a question of who governs during the interim period, com­
munists or opposition, that is crucial to the outcome of regime transition, but also 
with what kind of institutional capacity these governments were operating.
As demonstrated by Anna Grzymala-Busse in her analysis of post-communist 
state reconstruction, opportunistic behavior by ruling parties tends to be curbed in the 
presence of robust political opposition. This is similar to Heilman, Jones and 
Kaufmann’s finding that levels of state capture can be kept in check by sufficiently 
developed civil societies.12 Given the twin process of privatization and retrenchment 
of the state from many sectors of the economy in countries where state regulation 
was inefficient in the early transition, the state elites who benefited from the early 
stages of economic change also thwarted the rise of political institutions, such as 
political parties, that might have jeopardized their earnings by making them account­
able.13 Unchecked governing coalitions have tended to engage in more resource 
exploitation, clientelistic and rent seeking behavior. As a result, ruling parties in less 
competitive settings had a better hand in fashioning state institutions that facilitated 
such predatory behavior by thwarting the development of formal institutions of 
monitoring and oversight. To that effect, the remaining proof might lie in cases where 
the transition period did not lead to a democratic regime, where no institutionalized 
procedures for power transition existed, and where personal ties remained dominant 
throughout the transitional period and subsequently, even if elections were held. The 
following analyses will attempt to support these propositions empirically.
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Case and Variable Selection
The role of the first free and fair elections after an authoritarian episode is often 
considered to be the official step through which a democratic regime is established. 
However in reality, this time marker is often not definite. The democratic transition 
phase begins earlier—with the fall of the authoritarian regime. Between authoritarian 
regime collapse and the first legislative elections, an interim government— often com­
posed of the old rulers and their opposition—negotiates the rules by which the next 
government will be selected. We can differentiate between types of transitional gov­
ernments by the potency of the opposition facing communist parties upon the collapse 
of the communist regimes in ECE, or the breakup of the Soviet and Yugoslav states. 
The rules of the game are established through a series of round tables in which com­
peting parties are allowed to group and agree on the procedures.14 In this understand­
ing, a founding election is a popular ratification of this essentially elite-based pact. Yet 
even then, transition to democracy is rarely completed after the first elections. The 
subsequent process depends largely on constitution making, power distribution 
between the executive and legislative, electoral laws, and so on.
In most cases in ECE, first elections were an affirmation of a democratic transi­
tion toward consolidation. The Czech and Slovak republics, Hungary, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia, are unequivocal demonstrations of this 
kind of clearer transition. Other cases are less straightforward and, to complicate 
matters further, not all first post-authoritarian elections held in post-communist 
countries were founding elections. In some circumstances, the elections that are 
considered “founding” were the second elections after the authoritarian spell. As 
cases in point, Poland and Romania both held elections in 1989 and 1990, although 
the elections of 1991 and 1992, respectively, were the first free and fair democratic 
exercises, and generally considered to be the “founding” ones. But there are more 
contentious cases, namely Croatia, Albania, Moldova, Russia, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia ( FYROM) and Ukraine, where either the steps to democracy 
were more progressive or were even reversed later on. Romania, for instance, whose 
first post-authoritarian elections were probably fair, but not free, was still able to 
consolidate democracy upon the following elections. On occasion, what we face is 
more akin to electoral sequences rather than a clear instance of founding elections, 
such as in the case of Poland. What to do with a case such as the Ukraine whose 
transition to democracy extended over a longer period? Which elections are most 
“foundational” in such a protracted transition? Given that the fairness of elections is 
a relative concept, it becomes difficult to impose a strict empirical cutoff. As it may 
take some time to consolidate democracy, how do we recognize founding elections 
and can we revoke the concept after noticing a regime reversal some years later, as 
was the case in Russia?
O ’Donnell and Schmitter consider the first free and fair elections following an 
episode of authoritarianism to be founding elections.15 However in practice, the
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qualifications of “free” and “fair” are rarely absolutes but vary in degree. For instance, 
under a climate of electoral authoritarianism, elections that are broadly inclusive, and 
somewhat pluralistic and competitive are held regularly to confer legitimacy to a 
regime.16 What is more, it is difficult to truly assess the concept of fairness since it 
requires observation well before the election date and is difficult to measure with 
certainty in borderline cases which likely constitute the majority of occurrences in 
the case of post-communist countries. Keeping these caveats in mind, the empirical 
cutoff I selected is a Freedom House rating of at least 3 in 2006, which indicates a 
significant movement towards democracy, and hence presupposes the holding of 
relatively free and fair elections.17 Because of the nondiscreet aspect of this phenom­
enon, I also chose to look at a larger variety of cases, namely Russia and Moldova, 
where competitive elections are held although their regime is not fully democratic. 
I will carefully evaluate whether their inclusion significantly affects results where 
relevant.
At this point, it is important to mention that this article only focuses on the first 
free and fair elections. There are two reasons for this decision. First, since political 
parties have not had enough time to adapt and change the constitution of old elites 
in their ranks, or refit their image to be responsive in a situation where voters have 
a genuine choice, they still represent the most obvious element of continuity with the 
past in the electoral arena. Second, I also only include the first (founding elections) 
for theoretical reasons, given that it was already convincingly demonstrated that the 
political success of successor parties in the following elections is not necessarily 
linked to communist nostalgia or anti-democratic attitudes in the electorate, but to 
organizational developments post-transition.18
A. Dependent Variable: Rejection of the Past in Founding Elections
In the present article, I operationalize the concept of rejection of the communist 
past using the voting pattern of the first free and fair post-authoritarian elections. The 
rationale is based on the following assertion: “In a new regime, competition for 
political support is not so much competition between political parties as it is between 
democratic and undemocratic systems.”19 These first elections provided the arena in 
which the forces of the old and the new regimes faced one another.20 In the case at 
hand, I will consider the percentage of votes for the communist successor party, 
rather than the percentage of seats they obtained since the different countries under 
study displayed, and continue to display, different sets of electoral rules and hence, 
different levels of proportionality. Table 1 presents founding elections results for 
fourteen post-communist countries between 1990 and 1994. These elections can be 
considered “founding” as they were the first relatively free and fair post-authoritarian 
elections (in newly independent countries where applicable). What transpires from 
Table 1 is that the support for communist successor parties in these early elections
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Table 1












1 Latvia 6/5/1993 0.66 5.05 LSSP—Latvian Social 
Democratic Workers Party
2 Estonia 9/20/1992 1.50 5.90 EDWP—Estonian Democratic 
Workers’ Party
3 Croatia 8/2/1992 5.53 2.49 Social Democratic Party
4 Hungary 3/25/1990 10.89 3.80 MSzP—Hungarian Socialist 
Party
5 Poland 10/27/1991 11.99 10.86 Democratic Left Alliance
6 Ukraine 3/24/1994 12.72 19.23 KPU—Communist Party of the 
Ukraine
7 Czech Republic 6/8/1990 13.48 2.26 KSCM—Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia
8 Slovenia 12/6/1992 13.58 6.59 ZLSD—Associated List of 
Social Democrats
9 Slovakia 6/8/1990 13.81 4.98 KSCM—Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia
10 Romania 09/27/1992 27.72/10.19 4.79 FDSN—Democratic National 
Salvation Front/ FSN— 
National Salvation Front
11 Lithuania 10/25/1992 43.98 5.05 LDDP—Democratic Labor 
Party of Lithuania
12 Bulgaria 6/10/1990 47.50 2.43 BSP—Bulgarian Socialist Party
13 Macedonia 10/30/1994 48.33 3.28 SDSM—Social Democratic 
Union of Macedonia
14 Albania 4/7/1991 56.20 1.81 AWP—Albanian Worker’s Party
varies from practically none where the parties were banned and voting was based on 
exclusionary citizenship definitions (Estonia and Latvia) to very large in Bulgaria, 
Romania, Albania, and Lithuania.
B. Main Independent Variable: State Capacity
The way in which I propose to capture the concept of state capacity is to measure 
the quality of the provision of collective goods in each country.21 Some of the dif­
ficulty associated with this approach lies in finding not only measurable and compa­
rable instances of public-goods delivery, but also relevant data documenting their 
existence and performance in the early years of transition. The index is based on the 
aggregation of five indicators: the ratio of tax revenue to GDP in order to illustrate 
state taxing capacity, progress in infrastructure reform (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development), levels of corruption (Heritage Foundation), the
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quality of property rights protection (Heritage Foundation), and the ratio of contract 
intensive money These are public goods that even a minimally redistributive state 
should be able to provide. To make the final index, all indicators were standardized, 
and combined as a single measure. Factor and correlation analyses reveal that the 
association among the items is strong and that they measure a similar latent con­
struct.22
C. Control Variables and Rival Hypotheses
To control the way in which initial levels of state capacity influenced the electoral 
performance of communist successor parties, additional variables are included 
to measure the effect of party systems, the timing of founding elections during 
the transition, the level of power concentration in the executive branch, the incidence 
of economic crisis, and openness of economies the incidence of economic crisis, and 
openness of economies.
The Effective Number o f  parties (ENP) is set to capture the dynamics of party 
systems as well as to serve as a control for electoral rules given that party system 
size is related to district magnitude.23 While ENP is an outcome variable of the elec­
tions, I include this control to capture the dynamics of the rules governing the first 
elections. Following Barbara’s Geddes’s assumption that “those who make institu­
tional changes pursue their own individual interests above all else and their interests 
center on furthering their political careers,” we can expect former communist party 
elites to seek to maximize their performance in a competitive electoral setting 
through institutions that would benefit a large political party.24 Proportional repre­
sentation (PR) tends to promote parliaments with more political parties than single 
majority methods (SM). This item is a necessary control to assess the relative elec­
toral performance of successor parties. The final measure used in the analyses was 
calculated using the formula developed by Laakso and Taagepera, N =  1/X^,2, where 
Sf is the percentage of seats obtained by each party.25
Timing o f  founding elections. One of the main questions in the transition literature 
has revolved around the timing of first elections, whether holding speedy elections 
after authoritarian breakdown is a desirable option or not. On the one hand, Di Palma 
has advocated swift elections to “curb the chaos,” while Samuel Huntington has 
warned against the holding of swift elections in certain categories of countries, for 
instance where the dominant culture is not compatible with liberal democracy.26 
Interim governments set the date for the holding of such elections. Previous attempts 
were made to rank the strength of post-communist civil societies and the timing of 
first elections. Since timing is understood to have an effect on the fractionalization 
of party systems as well as the likelihood for democratic consolidation, this control 
becomes essential for two reasons. First, given that the negotiating power of 
communists in favor of certain institutions was most potent in the early moments of
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the transition, we should expect the holding of early first elections to yield more 
communist support.27 Another reason for associating early elections with better 
communist successor party electoral performance is that the short period of time 
could be hypothesized to militate against public mobilization towards newly formed 
parties. For this variable, I use a simple calculation of days elapsed between the 
official fall of the authoritarian regime ( or independence in the former Soviet and 
Yugoslav cases) and the date of the first legislative elections, ranging from 116 in 
Albania to 1,161 in the FYROM.
Executive dominance. A measure of the strength of executives is also included to 
control for the effects presidents have on party systems and electoral results. I use 
Polity IV based on the works of Ted Robert Gurr.28 Polity IV provides a measure 
called “constraints on chief executive” with a scale ranging from 1 through 7, where 
7 is executive parity or subordination. This control seems appropriate given that the 
effects of presidentialism (or weak legislatures) on party systems is vastly 
documented, more precisely Scott Mainwaring’s conjecture that strong executives 
reduce the incentive for forming large parties.29 In the case at hand, I hypothesize 
that the presence of a strong executive would work to favour successor communist 
parties (given their large size) by hindering the formation of other large political 
parties to challenge it.
Economic crisis (inflation). One of the most important determinants of voting 
behavior in advanced industrial economies is related to a country’s macroeconomic 
performance. Existing studies use either the rate of unemployment or the rate of 
inflation to capture the impact of economic crises on voting behavior. Owing to data 
availability and item reliability the following models include inflation rates as a 
percentage change in consumer price indices (CPI) rather than unemployment rates. 
Unemployment rates for the early 1990s are not available for all the cases included 
in this study. Moreover, unemployment rates are said to be less reliable as a 
measurement of economic crisis for less developed countries because they often do 
not show the recurrent high levels of structural unemployment.30 Inflation rates can 
be calculated for the trimester preceding the founding elections using the International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics. I hypothesize that substantial 
inflation immediately prior to the elections could serve to boost support for successor 
parties: the public could link economic hardships directly or indirectly to the process 
of democratization and become disenchanted with the political figures associated 
with the transition and hence, be tempted turn to their former leaders.
Economic liberalization. Last, I include a measure of economic liberalization in 
the models to control for the link between liberalization and democratization. The 
analyses performed in the following section utilize the EBRD Price Liberalization 
Index. Related to the argument developed above, many studies have documented
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Table 2
Predicted Probability of Founding Election by Level of State Capacity at T = 0 




No Founding Elections Founding Elections Difference
10 .88 .12 .76
20 .77 .13 .64
30 .71 .29 .42
40 .57 .43 .14
50 .44 .55 -.11
60 .17 .83 -.66
70 .11 .89 -.78
80 .10 .90 -.80
90 .04 .96 -.92
Predicted probabilities obtained with CLARIFY in STATA (Gary King, Michael Tomz, and Jason 
Wittenberg, “Marking Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation,” American 
Journal o f Political Science 44:2 (2000): 347-61.
that drastic neoliberal reforms introduced early in the transition led to hardships for 
people, consequently producing some discontentment with democratic opposition, at 
least in the shorter term.31 The end item included in the analyses is a difference 
between the starting score of the degree of economic liberalization (first year of 
independence and/or collapse of communist regime) and the score at the time of the 
founding elections, as published by the EBRD.32
Analyses
Do initial levels of state capacity have an influence over the holding of founding 
elections? The first step to determine the importance of initial levels of state capac­
ity was to perform a bivariate logistic regression, estimating the likelihood of hold­
ing founding elections (binary variable) given initial state capacity levels, using 
twenty-six post-communist countries.33 Despite limited sample size for performing 
this kind of estimation, evidence from the logistic regression (not shown) suggests 
that initial levels of state capacity have a large impact on the odds of experiencing 
founding elections to democracy. In particular, the odds of experiencing founding 
elections increase by about 4.5 times with each standard deviation increase in state 
capacity at t = 0. To further illustrate this relationship in more substantive terms, 
Table 2 presents a selection of predicted probabilities based on a binary logistic 
regression, at several values of initial state capacity scores. Although these figures 
should be interpreted conservatively given the estimated nature of the variable depict­
ing state capacity, as well as the small number of cases, the predicted probability of
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Table 3
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression (Robust) of the Effects of State 
Capacity at T = 0 on Founding Elections Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
P ( S E ) P(SE) P(SE) P ( S E ) P(SE) P ( S E )
Performance of Communist
Successor Party
State Capacity at t=0 -16.99*** -20.76*** -14.95*** -15.94* -11.65*** -15.70***
(3.59) (2.40) (5.37) (8.90) (6.64) (3.81)
Effective number of parties -1.87*" -1.79*** -1.43" -1.48" _1 71*.. -0.98***
(0.51) (0.41) (0.67) (0.38) (0.57) (0.38)
Time elapsed to elections -0.01
(0.01)
Strength of executive
(at founding election [FE]) 1.53
(4.33)
Economic crisis
(semester preceding FE) 0.01
(0.01)
A price liberalization
(FE A f = 0) -7.80**
(3.36)
Constant 33.18*" 34.66*** 35.78*** 25.13 30.92*** 36.23***
R2 .57 .67 .46 .47 .48 .56
Adjusted R2 .51 .61 .32 .32 .35 .45
Prob > F .00 .00 .05 .05 .04 .02
N 16 14 16 16 16 16
Cells contain unstandardized OLS regression coefficients, with robust standard errors in brackets. 
*Significant at the .1 level. **Significant at the .05 level. ***Significant at the .01 level.
experiencing founding elections is consistently tipped in favor of higher scores. 
Furthermore, the effects of state capacity on the probability of experiencing found­
ing elections seem to be linear, with the likelihood of first elections becoming higher 
with rises in state capacity scores.
Let us now turn to the second set of hypotheses, using the subgroup of countries 
which have experienced free and fair elections. Depending on the definition used, 
this group can either contain sixteen or fourteen states. Russia and Moldova are 
borderline cases that will be considered separately where appropriate.34 Do levels of 
state capacity have an influence over the electoral success of communist successor 
parties in founding elections? Table 3, which contains six regression models using a 
series of different independent variables, presents convincing evidence in favor of 
this hypothesis. In the six models estimated using different independent variables as 
controls, the parameter estimate depicting infrastructural state capacity at the first
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year of independence remains statistically significant, no matter what controls are 
included. Overall, for every unit of increase in state capacity at t = 0, there is a decline 
in the electoral performance of communist successor parties in founding elections.
An important finding concerns the inclusiveness of the definition of founding 
elections chosen, whether a strict or loose definition is more advisable. The results 
presented in Table 3 indicate that the removal of Russia and Moldova, in model 2 
does not substantially affect the significance of parameter estimates. Therefore, 
these results clearly demonstrate that successor communist parties consistently reg­
istered their best electoral performances in settings where the state was least efficient 
in collecting taxes and protecting private property, and where corruption levels and 
ratios of cash transactions were highest, even when several other factors are con­
trolled for, no matter which cases are included in the analyses.35
The second interesting finding displayed in Table 3 concerns the effective num­
bers of political parties that emerged in founding elections. All other factors remain­
ing constant, every unit increase in effective number of parties is associated with a 
decrease in electoral performance of communist successor parties. This result is not 
surprising given that larger majorities are more difficult to obtain in multiparty set­
tings, often due to the use of PR—but also that when faced with more options in a 
proportional system of representation, individuals were less likely to cast a vote for 
communist successor parties. Since the effective number of parties is a consequence 
of institutional features such as the chosen electoral formula, thresholds, and district 
magnitude, the significance of this variable also points to the importance of institu­
tional choice in explaining founding elections results.
Thus, knowing which parties selected the electoral system is one important key 
to the puzzle: the communists, the democratic opposition, or a compromise of the 
two factions, led to the adoption of rules that would facilitate the victory of the 
strongest faction. The Polish MDRP, and the Hungarian MSzP exited power during 
the transition and had little bearing on electoral rule making, which explains in part 
their feeble performance in the first elections. In Czechoslovakia, following the 
communist successor party’s loss of power, the electoral laws (proportional repre­
sentation) were imposed almost entirely by the opposition resulting in poor perfor­
mance of the KSCM.36 By contrast, in Romania, Albania, and to a lesser degree 
Bulgaria, communists were influential partners in caretaker governments and also 
managed to obtain strong electoral performance in the first democratic elections, 
despite popular resentment, due to built-in advantages in the electoral rules. In 
Bulgaria the communists (BSP) had to reach a compromise with the opposition for 
a mixed system, hoping that the seats distributed under the majoritarian method 
would be easier to capture. These rules were changed after the first elections for a 
more proportional set of rules using a 4 percent threshold.37
Surprisingly, the Polity IV index of presidential powers does not achieve statisti­
cal significance in either subgroup of countries. All other factors held constant, a 
unit increase in presidential prerogatives is only associated with an increase in the
14 East European Politics and Societies
electoral performance of communist successor parties in the founding elections 
when both Moldova and Latvia, two influential outliers, are pulled from the analysis. 
Echoing previous research arguing that powerful presidencies had been detrimental 
to the rise of political parties in Russia, we could have hypothesized that the pres­
ence of a strong president, either elected before the legislative elections, or stem­
ming from the former communist constitution, would benefit communist successor 
parties in founding elections, but this hypothesis is only weakly substantiated by the 
results presented in Table 3.38 According to Ishiyama, the concentration of authority 
in a single office imparts more importance to the personality of the individual hold­
ing the office and makes it more difficult for political parties to develop coherent 
programs.39 Although factors such as these may have favored communist successor 
parties where a president was already in position before the founding elections, the 
evidence in favor of this proposition is too weak to allow for generalization.
In spite of abundant theorizing linking timing of founding elections and some 
features of party systems ( such as fractionalization), the results contained in Table 3 
indicate that the period of time elapsed between the official fall of the authoritarian 
regime and the holding of first elections did not have an impact on the performance 
of communist successor parties no matter which countries or variables are included 
in the model. This finding is relatively counterintuitive since it could have been 
hypothesized that early elections would benefit successor parties whose infrastruc­
ture at the local level was the most organized, allowing only limited time for rival 
parties to emerge and be competitive on the national scene.
Another surprising finding from Table 3 is the lack of association between some 
of the economic variables thought to affect popular sentiments towards incumbent 
political parties. These economic variables include economic crisis operationalized 
through levels of inflation in the semester prior to the legislative elections. This is 
not found to be statistically significant. Despite this surprising finding, the differ­
ence in price liberalization (between t = 0 and the first elections) has a statistically 
significant impact on the performance of communist successor parties, albeit not in 
the direction expected. In the case at hand, a unit increase in difference between 
starting point and the score in the year of the founding elections has a negative 
impact on communist successor party electoral performance. All former communist 
economies, except Belarus and Uzbekistan, underwent serious contractions in the 
early 1990s coupled with massive inflation, translating into heavy losses in real 
revenue and hardships for citizens across the region. Although citizenry in the heavi­
est hit countries where shock therapy was employed might have turned against pro­
ponents of economic liberalization, our analyses present little evidence in favor of 
this scenario, at least at the macro level. Even when pulling other controls from the 
analyses, no matter which country sub-group is employed, the level of inflation pre­
ceding the elections appears not to have a statistically significant effect on the perfor­
mance of communist successor parties in founding elections, while the difference in 
price liberalization has a robust negative impact on the dependent variable.40 Based
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on these variables the level of economic voting driven by hardship in founding 
elections seems to be less important than hypothesized. Nonetheless, individual- 
level surveys with personal retrospective economic evaluations to truly estimate 
economic effects on voting behavior in these elections would be needed to rule out 
this hypothesis. National aggregate figures might not accurately reflect the subtle­
ties of individuals’ perceived situations, and high aggregation might cover up more 
than we think in societies in which incomes are highly disproportionally distributed.
Discussion and Conclusions
Taken together these results reveal that low levels of state capacity in early transi­
tion contexts were not conducive to the holding of free and fair elections in former 
communist countries. Furthermore, among countries in which founding elections 
were held, levels of state capacity were also strongly associated with the success of 
successor communist parties. States that were less dependable providers of public 
goods were also those in which successor communist parties registered their best 
electoral performances. There are two reasons for this finding. First, the rise of an 
independent and active civil society could be impaired in environments of inefficient 
public good provision. As illustrated by Richard Rose, in settings where the govern­
ment failed to accomplish basic tasks of statehood, citizens were more likely to 
exhibit what he called anti-modem attitudes: high levels of distrust towards one 
another and towards institutions in general, including political parties, but also a 
propensity to use alternative networks or to resort to bribery to “get things done.” To 
illustrate this, Rose further noted that, mirroring the expectations of citizens that the 
system will or will not deliver what they are entitled to in the late 1990s, former 
Soviet citizens were several times more likely than Czechs, for example, to turn to 
anti-modern behavior and bribery to obtain goods and services they needed.41 The 
results from the present article expand on these findings. The strength of veto players 
that emerged after the collapse of communist regimes was a function of the strength 
and vibrancy of civil society. Successor communist parties performed poorly in elec­
tions where an opposition appeared that was robust enough to take part in the new 
rule-making, and where political parties capable of gaining electoral support 
emerged and competed in a free arena. At the other end of the spectrum, in the coun­
tries where the communist parties’ informal ties were deep enough to undermine the 
state (measured through low state capacity scores) the elections that were held did 
not lead to the installation of democratic regimes.
Second, the results presented in this article cast a shadow on the notion of “found­
ing elections” as an absolute concept that can be used reliably as a time marker 
between regime types. Results point more to a range in the concept of freedom and 
fairness of these nonetheless important elections. In reality, there were variations 
in the realm of fairness leading to strong electoral performances by communist
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successor parties in spite of widespread popular resentment in countries where the 
state institutions were least efficient. In these cases, officials could use state 
resources for personal and political gains, but could also push in favor of electoral 
institutions that would maximize their power and access to assets. The use of state 
controlled media, tax audits, and police forces to monitor and harass opponents, all 
contribute to lessen the quality of electoral competition. What these findings ulti­
mately suggest is that the amount of state capture and the depth of patronage net­
works preceding the transition seemed to have shaped the first post-communist 
electoral races more than the literature seems to allow for. Given the importance that 
founding elections have for the development of party systems in new democracies,42 
but also of subsequent institution building,43 the findings presented here underline 
the need to undertake further work on identifying factors that either favored or 
impeded a swift rejection of the authoritarian past in post-communist countries.
Notes
1. Hanna Back and Axel Hadenius, “Democracy and State Capacity: Exploring a J-Shaped 
Relationship,” Governance 21:1 (2008): 1-24; Michael C. Bratton and Eric C. Chang, “State Building 
and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Forward, Backwards, or Together?” Comparative Political 
Studies 39:9 (2006): 1059-83; Valerie Bunce, “Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded 
Generalizations,” Comparative Political Studies 53 (2000): 703-34; Jessica Fortin, “Is There a 
Necessary Condition for Democracy? The Role of State Capacity in Post-Communist Countries,” 
Comparative Political Studies 45:7 (2012): 903-930; Mohsin Hashim, “Putin’s Etatization Project and 
Limits to Democratic Reforms in Russia,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38:1 (2005): 25-48; 
K. Hendley, “Legal Development in Post-Soviet Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 13 (1997): 228-51; 
Stephen Holmes, “When Less State Means Less Freedom,” Transition 5 (1996): 5-15; Evelyne Huber, 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, “The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, 
Participatory, and Social Dimensions,” in Transitions to Democracy, ed. L. Anderson (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 1999); Robert R. Kaufman, “Approaches to the Study of State Reform in Latin 
American and Postsocialist Countries,” Comparative Politics 31:3 (1999): 357-75; Juan Linz, “The Perils 
of Presidentialism,” in The Global Resurgence o f Democracy, ed. L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner 
(Baltimore, MD: John S. Hopkins University Press, 1996); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems o f 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: John S. Hopkins University Press, 1996); 
Guillermo O’Donnell, “On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American 
View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries,” World Development 21:8 (1993): 1355-69; Adam 
Przeworski, ed., Sustainable Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Cynthia 
Roberts and Thomas Sherlock, “Bringing the Russian State Back In: Explanations of the Derailed 
Transition to Market Democracy,” Comparative Politics 31:4 (1999): 477-98; Richard Rose and Doh 
Chull Shin, “Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave Democracies,” British Journal o f 
Political Science 31 (2001): 331-54; Robert Sharlet, “Legal Transplants and Political Mutations: The 
Reception of Constitutional Law in Russia and the Newly Independent States,” Eastern European 
Constitutional Review 7:4 (1998): 107-23; Ezra Suleiman, “Bureaucracy and Democratic Consolidation: 
Lessons from Eastern Europe,” in Transitions to Democracy, ed. L. Anderson (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1999); Charles Tilly, Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and 
Xu Wang, “Mutual Empowerment of State and Society: Its Nature, Condition, Mechanisms, and Limits,” 
Comparative Politics 31:2 (1999): 231-49.
Fortin / Explaining Post-Communist Founding Elections 17
2. Linz and Stepan, Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation.
3. Valerie Bunce, “Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lesons from the Post-Communist 
Experience,” World Politics 55 (2003): 167-92; and Steven M. Fish, “The Determinants of Economic 
Reform in the Post-Communist World,” East European Politics and Societies 12 (1998): 33-77.
4. Andras Korosenayi, “Revival of the Past or New Beginning? The Nature of Post-Communist 
Politics,” Political Quarterly 62:1 (2005): 52-74. Together, the new political parties (HDF, AFD, FYD) 
gained over 50 percent of the votes. By contrast, the pre-communist historical political parties (SHP, CDP, 
SDP) gained closed to 22 percent of the vote.
5. Przeworski, Sustainable Democracy, 12, 110.
6. Barbara Geddes, “A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe,” 
Comparative Political Studies 28:2 (1995): 239-74; Richard Rose, “Beware the Opinion Polls—There 
Are Too Many Parties to Pick One Winner,” Transitions 22 (1995): 6-13; and Richard Rose, 
Understanding Post-Communist Transformation. A Bottom Up Approach (London: Routledge, 2009).
7. Conor O’Dwyer, Runaway State-Building. Patronage Politics and Democratic Development 
(Baltimore, MD: John S. Hopkins University Press, 2006).
8. Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990).
9. Jessica Fortin, “A Tool to Evaluate State Capacity in Post-Communist Countries, 1989-2006,” 
European Journal o f Political Research 49:5 (2010): 654-86.
10. Fish, “The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World.”
11. Sidney Tarrow, “Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles 
of Protest,” Western Societies Occasional Paper No. 21 (Ithaca, NY: Center for International Studies, 
Cornell University, 1991).
12. Anna Grzymala-Busse, Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post- 
Communist Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Joel Heilman, Geraint 
Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann, “Seize the State, Seize the Day. State Capture, Corruption and Influence in 
Transition,” Policy Research Working Paper 2444 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000).
13. Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Resisting the State. Reform and Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
14. Vernon Bogdanor, “Founding Elections and Regime Change,” Electoral Studies 9:4 (1990): 
288-294.
15. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1986).
16. Andreas Schedler, “The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism,” in Electoral Authoritarianism. The 
Dynamics o f Unfree Competition, ed. A. Schedler (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2006).
17. With this cutoff, we are left with fourteen cases: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the FYROM, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
18. John T. Ishiyama, “Party Organization and the Political Success of the Communist Successor 
Parties,” Social Science Quarterly 82:4 (2001): 844-64.
19. Rose, Understanding Post-Communist Transformation, 164.
20. Bogdanor, “Founding Elections and Regime Change”; O’Dwyer, Runaway State-Building; and 
Gordon White, “Democratizing Eastern Europe: The Elections of 1990,” Electoral Studies 9:4 (1990): 
277-87.
21. Fortin, “A Tool to Evaluate State Capacity in Post-Communist Countries, 1989-2006.”
22. Ibid. Despite being high in validity and reliability, this index suffers from an important weakness: 
missing data in the early years of transition. To make up for such a lacunae, some of the missing cases 
(for tax revenue and contract intensive money) were imputed using Amelia II, a multiple imputation 
program developed by King et al., the best option available to produce plausible and unbiased results. 
Gary King, James Honaker, Anne Joseph, and Kenneth Scheve, “Analyzing Incomplete Political Science
18 East European Politics and Societies
Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation,” American Political Science Review 95:1 
(2001): 49-69; and Paul D. Allison, “Multiple Imputation for Missing Data: A Cautionary Tale,” 
Sociological Methods and Research 28:3 (2000): 301-9. In the case of corruption and private property 
protection, a conservative data interpolation technique where starting values are closely associated with 
the first year of actual data coverage by Heritage Foundation (in most cases around 1995) was adopted. 
The final index of state capacity used in this article therefore contains both actual measurements and 
estimated measurements of individual indicators and should be handled and interpreted with a measure 
of prudence.
23. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York, NY: Wiley, 1980); Octavio Amorim Neto and 
Gary W. Cox, “Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Partie s ” American Journal 
o f Political Science 41:1 (1997): 149-74; and William H. Riker, “The Two-Party System and Duverger’s 
Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science,” American Political Science Review 16 (1982): 
753-66.
24. Geddes, “A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe,” 241.
25. Markuu Laasko and Rein Taagepera, “Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application 
to West Europe,” Comparative Political Studies 3 (1979): 3-27.
26. Di Palma, To Craft Democracies; and Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in 
the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
27. Geddes, “A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe.”
28.1 use Polity IV based on the works of Ted Robert Gurr. See Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, 
“Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2003,” The Polity IV Dataset 
(2003), http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/.
29. Mikhail G. Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga V. Shvetsova, “Party Fragmentation and 
Presidential Elections in Post-Communist Democracies,” Constitutional Political Economy 10:3 (1999): 
3-26; Scott Mainwaring, “Presidentialism, Multipartism and Democracy: The Difficult Combination,” 
Comparative Political Studies 26 (1993): 198-228; Louis Massicotte and André Blais, “Mixed Electoral 
Systems: A Conceptual and Empirical Survey ’’Electoral Studies 18:3 (1999): 341-66; Robert G. Moser, 
Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in Russia (Pittsburgh, 
PA: Pittsburgh University Press, 2001); and Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and 
Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992).
30. Gary M. Reich, “Coordinating Party Choice in Founding Elections: Why Timing Matters,” 
Comparative Political Studies 34 (2001): 1237-63. Also of importance, the two existing measurements 
of unemployment covering post-communist countries are not always similar and can lead to different 
results depending which data source is employed.
31. Jan Fidrmuc, “Economics of Voting in Post-Communist Countries,” Electoral Studies 19:2/3 
(2000): 199-217; Alexander C. Pacek, “Macroeconomic Conditions and Electoral Politics in East Central 
Europe,” American Journal o f Political Science 38:3 (1994): 723-44; Alexander S. Tsipko, “Why 
Gennady Zyuganov's Communist Party Finished First,” Demokratizatsiya 4:2 (1996): 185-200; Joshua 
Tucker, “Economic Conditions and the Vote for Incumbent Parties in Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, 
and the Czech Republic from 1990 to 1996,” Post-Soviet Affairs 17:4 (2001): 309-31.
32. EBRD, Transition Report (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1999).
33. In the following models, I consider the following countries as not having undergone founding 
elections: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Tajikistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan.
34. While we can no longer consider these countries democracies, or as transitioning towards democ­
racy, both countries experienced competitive elections in the 1990s. For instance, Russia’s 1993 elections 
did not lead to a victory of the party of the president. Likewise in Moldova, before the communists 
regained power and restricted competition, the political arena had been competitive throughout the 1990s.
Fortin / Explaining Post-Communist Founding Elections 19
35. In models 1 and 2, no Z)Fbeta value is located above the threshold of 1. No observation presents 
a Cook’s D statistic is above 4In — k -  1. Influential outliers here do not technically pose a serious 
problem.
36. Anna Grzymala-Busse, “Authoritarian Determinants of Democratic Party Competition,” Party 
Politics 12:3 (2006): 415-37.
37. Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
38. Terry D. Clark and Jill Wittrock, “Presidentialism and the Effect of Electoral Law in Postcommunist 
Systems: Regime Type Matters,” Comparative Political Studies 38:2 (2005): 171-88; Timothy Colton, 
“Suerpresideintialism and Russia’s Backward State,” Post-Soviet Affairs 11:2 (1995): 144-48; Eugene 
Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia (Boulder, CO: M.E. Sharpe, 1997); John T. Ishiyama, “A Typology 
of Communist Successor Parties. An Overview,” in The Communist Successor Parties o f Central and 
Eastern Europe, ed. A. Bozoki and J. T. Ishiyama (Boulder, CO: M.E. Sharpe, 2002); Philipp G. Roeder, 
“Varieties of Post-Soviet Authoritarian Regimes,” Post-Soviet Affairs 10 (1994): 61-101; and Stephen 
White, Matthew Wyman, and Olga Kryshtanovskaya, “Parties and Politics in Post-Communist Russia,” 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 28:2 (1995): 183-202.
39. Ishiyama, “Typology of Communist Successor Parties,” 279.
40. Also controlling for potential outliers.
41. Rose, Understanding Post-Communist Transformation, 69.
42. Reich, “Coordinating Party Choice in Founding Elections.”
43. Nancy Bermeo, “Redemocratization and Transition Elections: A Comparison of Spain and 
Portugal,” Comparative Politics 19 (1987): 213-31; and Bunce, “Rethinking Recent Democratization.”
Jessica Fortin-Rittberger is a senior research associate at GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social 
Sciences (Germany). Her areas of research interest include political developments in former communist 
countries, political institutions and their measurement, the effects of electoral rules, as well as the impact 
of state capacity on democratization. Her work has appeared in the European Journal o f Political 
Research, International Political Science Review, and Comparative Political Studies.
